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Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy
- *Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4K1; and ‡Department of Integrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720
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Edited by Maurice R. Hilleman, Merck Institute for Vaccinology, West Point, PA, and approved June 24, 2003 (received for review March 6, 2003)
Abstract
The recent threat of bioterrorism has fueled debate on smallpox vaccination policy for the United States. Certain policy proposals call for voluntary mass vaccination; however, if individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to self-interest, the level of herd immunity achieved may differ from what is best for the population as a whole. We present a synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. This shortfall results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.
Footnotes
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↵ † To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: cbauch{at}uoguelph.ca.
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This paper was submitted directly (Track II) to the PNAS office.
- Copyright © 2003, The National Academy of Sciences
